

# Ex-Rebel Commanders and Postwar Statebuilding: Subnational Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire

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## Abstract

Ex-rebel commanders play a central role in peacebuilding after civil war, often deciding where governments consolidate authority and whether states relapse into violence. Yet the influence and mobilization power of these actors is not uniform: in some areas commanders retain strong social ties to civilian populations after integrating into the state, while in other areas such ties wither away. What accounts for this variation? This article advances a theory of local goods provision and political accountability to explain why commander-community linkages endure or decline after post-conflict transitions. Drawing on multiple data sources from Côte d'Ivoire — including an original survey of community informants in former rebel-occupied regions — it shows that commanders retained social capital and access to networks of supporters in areas where insurgents provided essential goods to civilians during war. Where insurgents' wartime rule involved coercion and abuse, by contrast, ex-rebel commanders were more likely to lose influence and mobilization power. These findings challenge existing theories of rebel institution-building and state formation, suggesting that effective governance can help armed movements build popular support and win civil wars, but simultaneously create regionally-embedded strongmen who are able to facilitate but also resist the centralizing efforts of state rulers.

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## The Puzzle: Commander-Community Ties After Civil War

The towns of Sangouiné and Mahapleu in western Côte d'Ivoire were both occupied by the Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel movement during the Ivorian civil war (2002-2011). After defeating Laurent Gbagbo's government and integrating into the national army, however, the trajectories of the FN commanders in these towns diverged starkly.

In Sangouiné, not far from the Liberian border, everybody knows Kassero. The *commandant* is building a new hotel at the west end of town, near the juncture to Podiagouiné. Even though Kassero is a northerner — a Senoufo from Korhogo — the village chief and his notables all call Kassero a *fil* *du village*. If there is a death in an important family and custom requires an expensive funeral, Kassero often helps to pay for it. If there is a problem between residents and local bandits on the roads, Kassero is called to “advise” on what is to be done. “When you do good for people, for the community,” one long-time resident explained, “the people will hold you in their heart, they will not cross their arms for you.”<sup>1</sup> Several of Kassero's fellow comrades from the north have also stuck around in the town. On the day I visited his hotel construction site, I found several of them at work, unloading trucks and pouring concrete under the blazing afternoon sun. Kassero himself — now an army captain in the Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) — no longer lives in the region, and he has not called himself *commandant de secteur* in Sangouiné for over seven years since the end of the rebellion. Yet it is difficult to imagine life in the town without him.

Less than 30 kilometers further west lies the town of Mahapleu. Like Sangouiné it is a predominantly Yacouba (Dan)-speaking community. But unlike in its easterly neighbor, the former FN *commandant* in Mahapleu, an army captain named Ondo, is rarely seen today. Ondo once ruled this mid-sized town as a personal fiefdom. Like Kassero, Ondo was a *nordiste* and a stranger to the community at the beginning of the war. Yet after Ondo integrated into the FRCI, his ties to the community in Mahapleu all but vanished. Nobody can recall the last time Ondo came to greet the village chief, and residents balk at the idea that he would be invited to social events or called upon

to help resolve security issues. “He [Ondo] did nothing for us here,” one village elder said. “He has no more power. If he came, the population would not welcome him.”<sup>2</sup>

The contrasting anecdotes of Kassero and Ondo illustrate how the strength of social ties between ex-rebel commanders and local communities vary widely in the aftermath of civil wars, even across otherwise similar localities. This variation is important, given the impact that ex-rebel commanders have on stability, disarmament processes, and civil-military relations in fragile states. Though strong vertical linkages between militant groups and local populations are believed to contribute to rebel group cohesion during armed conflicts (Staniland 2014), such linkages can also be leveraged by former armed group leaders to challenge elected postwar regimes. In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, regionally embedded ex-rebel officers like Kassero have threatened the cohesion of the national army and the authority of President Alassane Ouattara’s government (Martin 2018; Piccolino 2018). When mutinies broke out among ex-rebel soldiers in January 2017, demanding payouts and promotions from the government, Kassero’s strong linkages in Sangouiné allowed him to rapidly mobilize his supporters to join in the protests.<sup>3</sup> By contrast, in Mahapleu, none of the former combatants I interviewed had left to participate. One explained, “Maybe if you have a *grand frère* in the army, you will get something. For me, the fight is over. Our *grand frère* [Ondo] does not see us.”<sup>4</sup> Instead of retaining an independent power base, Ondo relies on his position within the military hierarchy and serves as a “loyal officer” of the regime.<sup>5</sup>

Postwar Côte d’Ivoire is hardly alone in its struggle to consolidate peace and uniform state authority amid the persistent influence of former militant group commanders. In approximately 25% of all civil wars, rebel groups win outright and form ruling regimes. And among conflicts ended through negotiated settlements, nearly 40% include provisions for the integration of rebel leaders into the army, government, or civil service (Högbladh 2011). These insurgents-turned-statesmen play a profound role in peacebuilding and state reconstruction. Past research shows, for example, that ex-rebel commanders are key actors in the remobilization of former combatants (Themnér 2015, Daly 2016), as well as the provision of services and patronage resources (Marten 2012;

Podder 2014). Research on warlords and armed strongmen also suggests these actors are essential to the preservation of social order in fragile states (Blair and Kalmanovitz 2016), and that central rulers are often impelled to work through these actors to extend their authority (Malejacq 2016; Themnér and Utas 2016; Driscoll 2015; Tull and Mehler 2005).

Despite the importance of ex-militant group commanders, surprisingly little research has examined the endurance or decline of social linkages between commanders and former rebel-ruled communities systematically. Treatments of ex-rebel warlords in Côte d’Ivoire and other post-conflict states often portray these actors as one-dimensional “specialists in violence” (Bavier 2015; Marten 2012; Reno 2011), while neglecting the layered forms of authority and social capital that continue to link ex-rebel commanders to civilian populations long after civil wars end. These commander-community ties are an essential part of the peacebuilding puzzle, impacting both local-level order and commanders’ capacities to challenge national rulers and extract rents from the state (Themnér 2017; Driscoll 2015). It is therefore important to ask: why do ex-rebel commanders sometimes maintain strong linkages to communities they ruled during civil war, but sometimes do not?

To answer this question, this article advances an accountability-based theory of commander-community linkages, drawing on subnational evidence collected through extensive fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire. I argue that in order to preserve their bargaining power during conflict-to-peace transitions, ex-rebel commanders have incentives to sustain access to networks of youth and former combatants who can be remobilized in service of the commander’s interests. However, commanders’ abilities to tap into such networks in the postwar period are contingent on prior rebel governance practices within insurgent-ruled communities: only where commanders cultivated sufficient legitimacy and social standing through the provision of essential goods and cooperation with community elites will they be able to retain access to personal support networks after their integration into the state. The local influence and mobilization power of ex-rebel commanders is thus intimately connected to processes of governance, network-

building, and rebel-community interactions that take place well before conflicts end.

I illustrate this argument by analyzing an original dataset of rebel-ruled localities in Côte d’Ivoire, including evidence from a unique survey of local historical experts. The results show that even after accounting for a large number of potential confounders, in localities where FN rebels provided more public services during the occupation, and where rebels regularly permitted citizens to voice demands for improved goods provision, commanders were significantly more likely to retain social and political influence after the 2011 transition. By contrast, in areas where FN rule was characterized by violence and predation, commanders’ postwar linkages were less likely to endure. I then use independently collected survey evidence to show that networks of non-state armed actors remained more active in areas where FN wartime rule was collaborative rather than predatory. Together, these patterns suggest that wartime investments in welfare-enhancing local institutions later strengthened the hand of ex-rebel commanders, allowing them to retain private armed networks and mobilization power outside the formal military hierarchy. To bolster the case that wartime governance practices exert an independent effect on postwar commander-community linkages, I also investigate the determinants of collaborative rule by the FN, and find that governance patterns are not endogenous to prewar political sentiments.

Given the potentially destabilizing role of ex-militant group commanders in many post-conflict states ([Driscoll 2015](#)) – not least in postwar Côte d’Ivoire – these findings challenge the theory that territorial governance and strong local roots by winning armed groups lead to more successful postwar statebuilding. [Huang \(2016\)](#), for instance, argues that “war-derived institutional capacity is likely to facilitate the creation of a stronger state” and that the “nominally representative institutions built in war time ... serve the purpose of ensuring regime power in peace time” (pp. 47-48). [Lyons \(2016\)](#) also argues that armed movements with experience governing territory will make more effective rulers, since governance provides opportunities to develop “trained, effective and disciplined cadres,” (p. 170) while [Toft \(2009\)](#) suggests that it is the “strong domestic support base” of winning insurgent groups that provide the basis for peace and

democracy after rebel victory (pp. 114-115). Yet this consensus overlooks important local-level variation in statebuilding outcomes, and, critically, the fact that strong local support networks can permit ex-rebel commanders to *resist* rather than facilitate central state power. This dynamic is likely to be most severe in contemporary civil wars, where winning coalitions often lack strong horizontal bonds among their political and military leaders born of shared ideology or anticolonial struggle (Staniland 2014). In such cases, rather than preparing armed movements to be statebuilders or democratizers, collaborative rebel governance can empower regional strongmen and exacerbate the problem of “diffuse social control” that has long frustrated the centralizing efforts of rulers in postcolonial states (Migdal 1988).

The article also presents novel insights about the role of local accountability in shaping how and why armed actors – and rebel field commanders specifically – become “embedded” in the context of internal conflicts. Previous accounts of the local support networks of armed movements have stressed the role of insurgents’ ethnic and political identities (Staniland 2014; Kalyvas 2015), patterns of recruitment and deployment (Daly 2016), and fear-based coercion (Kriger 1992; Reno 2015). In contrast, I find that personalized forms of authority grounded in insurgents’ responsiveness to citizen interests and brokerage relationships with local elites form the strongest basis for ex-rebel commanders’ enduring mobilization power. More generally, to understand how and why armed groups retain power after conflicts end, we must think about these actors not only in terms of their capacities for violence, but also as entities who are deeply enmeshed in the social order of their support bases and who can be held accountable by local residents for their contributions to the welfare of communities.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section outlines a theory of commander-community linkages in post-conflict states. The third section discusses the research design and the community informant survey in Côte d’Ivoire. The fourth section presents key descriptive findings, and the fifth section uses an array of statistical analyses to show how patterns of wartime rule shaped commanders’ postwar ties to rebel-ruled localities. The article concludes by discussing implications for state

formation following insurgent-to-military integration.

## **An Accountability Theory of Commander-Community Ties**

To explain why militant group commanders either sustain or lose ties to rebel-ruled communities after post-conflict transitions, I make two arguments. First, I clarify commanders' incentives by theorizing war-to-peace transitions as periods of heightened uncertainty that trigger acute fears for political survival among ex-rebel commanders. Aware that political elites will be in a position to renege on past promises to commanders once they are installed in power, ex-rebel commanders have incentives to tap their vertical linkages and networks of mobilizable supporters as a source of bargaining leverage. The second argument — and main focus of the empirical testing — explains the robustness of these local linkages as a function of insurgents' past governance practices. Wartime governance matters because commanders' abilities to access territorial support bases after transitions to peace are conditional on the continued cooperation of community residents and local elite "gatekeepers." The nature of insurgents' wartime rule is thus the key conditioning variable that shapes the longevity of commanders' linkages to rebel-ruled communities and their access to extra-military support networks.

### ***Postwar Transitions and Ruler-Commander Bargaining***

From the perspective of armed group commanders making the jump from insurgency to peacetime politics, a central problem is gauging whether or not the political elites who aligned with them during war — and made promises of future military promotions, resources, and legal protection — can be trusted to fulfill their pledges. This uncertainty arises for several reasons. First, passing to a peacetime environment means that the political elites who take up executive public office become the masters of the resources of the state. These resources create new opportunities for political elites to build out their coalition and reduce their dependence on erstwhile armed supporters. Second,

the new ruling coalition is likely to face intense internal competition upon seizing the state, as a swelling number of factions stake claims to power and resources (Christia 2012). Third, norms of civil-military relations and constraints on new state elites are likely to be weak and untested, leaving ex-rebel military officers with little certainty about the future behavior of rulers (Roessler 2011). These conditions make it difficult for political elites to credibly signal their intention to make good on their promises, and ex-rebel commanders will fear a steep drop-off in their own bargaining leverage as their movement integrates into the state and distributional politics takes hold.

To ensure survival, ex-rebel commanders have incentives to seek an insurance plan: independent networks of armed supporters in regions where they exercise residual social control. These supporters may be former rebel group members who remain attached to ex-combatant organizations, or members of other local networks – such as youth associations or self-defense militia – that can be repurposed in service of commanders’ interests in exchange for economic benefits (Themnér 2015). By preserving extra-military networks beyond the control of central rulers, commanders can threaten to activate their armed supporters to disrupt stability or, as occurs commonly among military officers in fragile states, launch a bid to remove political elites from power (Harkness 2016; Roessler 2011). Confronted with these threats, rulers are more likely to grant commanders concessions in the form of military promotions, payouts, and protection from legal prosecution for human rights abuses.

However, not all ex-rebel commanders are equally positioned to sustain local mobilization power once peacetime politics take hold. As Themnér (2015) notes, the demobilization process following civil war is often accompanied by a detachment of military commanders from their subordinate networks, as military and political power is transfigured and rank-and-file combatants seek new sources of patronage. Other local political and business elites, once displaced from conflict-affected zones, may return to compete for power and influence in localities where commanders once reigned supreme. And crucially, local citizens and gatekeepers may reject the continued presence of former rebel actors who seized power in their community by force. To account

for the endurance or decline of commanders' social ties and mobilization power within rebel-ruled communities, I shift the analysis to the wartime period and consider the legacies of insurgent rule.

### ***Wartime Governance and Enduring Mobilization Power***

Ex-rebel commanders do not construct local support networks from a *tabula rasa*. Rather, they are constrained by the prior actions, relationships, and reputations that militant groups acquire within rebel-occupied communities. Past research demonstrates that a major preoccupation of rebel field commanders during civil wars is the creation of rules and institutions that regulate rebel interactions with local populations, and their responses to the basic wants and needs of residents (Arjona 2016; Arjona and Mampilly 2015; Huang 2016; Stewart 2018; Weinstein 2007). I argue that these varied patterns of wartime rule affect the ability of ex-rebel commanders to access mobilization resources in the postwar period.

Wartime governance can be viewed as a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is *collaborative* rule. Under this form of rule, local administrators opt to invest in basic services and goods provisions for the population, provide opportunities for citizen input and voice, and partner with existing local elites to “co-produce” governance for the community (Ostrom 1996). By creating such a social contract, insurgent rulers seek to build a virtuous cycle of collaboration and reciprocity, whereby rebels' governance effectiveness and responsiveness is rewarded by citizens with greater compliance with rebel group policies (Weinstein 2007). In the liberated territories of Ethiopia controlled by the Tigray People's Liberation Front, for example, insurgents created representative councils and *gim gima* structures as institutions for public debate, which insurgent leaders hoped would persuade more citizens to accept the legitimacy of the insurrection (Young 1996). Variants of collaborative rule have emerged under militant groups in countries as diverse as Uganda (Weinstein 2007), Colombia (Arjona 2016), and Afghanistan (Malejacq 2016).

An important consequence of this social contract-based governance is that it can

bolster the ability of insurgent commanders to sustain access to valued extra-military networks in the post-conflict period. By acquiring reputations as effective providers of social order in the eyes of local populations, commanders will enjoy continued political influence and information within rebel-ruled communities after war's end, bolstering their mobilization capabilities. This mechanism operates through both grassroots and elite-level channels. First, local residents who benefit from effective goods and services resulting from the actions of rebel occupiers can reward commanders with social recognition that increases commanders' political capital and legitimacy.<sup>6</sup> As [Daly \(2016\)](#) argues, the local standing of former armed groups after war varies according to “the duration of the group's presence, the nature of its rule, and whether it brought positive changes to the neighborhoods, sparking a sort of retrospective voting” (p. 28). [Tsai \(2007\)](#) similarly argues that in contexts of weak formal accountability, residents can award “moral standing, esteem or respect” to governing officials as rewards for providing above-average goods and services (p. 356). Since rebel governance systems are often highly decentralized, local commanders have broad discretionary powers to cultivate a popular image by marshalling resources to meet civilian needs ([Arjona 2016](#)). Social recognition among residents in turn endows commanders with perceived legitimacy and permits them to remain embedded in local social life, even as post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives attempt to reduce or eliminate these ties.

Second, local elites also play a critical role. Powerful elite residents who are brought into collaborative systems of wartime rule can facilitate ex-rebel commanders' continued access to human networks within the community. These “gatekeepers” — including traditional and customary authorities, party organizers, or local commercial elites — function as a kind of social filter, determining which external actors get through to the other side ([Themnér and Utas 2016](#)). When these gatekeepers are brought into systems of collaborative wartime governance alongside insurgent commanders, they may develop a degree of dependency on the patronage resources and services that commanders provide. In exchange for the continuation of these benefits, which help local elites sustain social order, gatekeepers can help sustain connections between ex-rebel com-

manders and potential supporters within the community. For example, gatekeepers can invite commanders to ceremonial events, solicit commanders' input on local security matters, or facilitate introductions between commanders and other community members.

At the other end of the spectrum of wartime governance, under *predatory rule*, rebel occupiers abstain from significant service provision or power-sharing with local elites. Instead, militants rely heavily on coercive violence to ensure compliance and control, and force out or marginalize local gatekeepers who oppose their authority. Rather than striking a bargain with local populations to create reciprocal cooperation, predatory occupiers prioritize the extraction of material resources and govern with little concern for residents' preferences. Prototypical examples of predatory rebel rulership include territories controlled by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) ([Reno 2015](#)), or the Renamo insurgency in Mozambique ([Weinstein 2007](#)).

Where wartime governance is highly predatory, residents and gatekeepers are more likely to close off ex-rebel commanders' local mobilization power after the transition to peace. Residents exposed to coercive governance practices in the past may develop negative mental associations between the armed movement and the well-being of their community, creating social stigma for individuals who continue associating with the former commander ([Kaplan and Nussio 2018](#)). Local gatekeepers who were expelled or sidelined from governance roles during the war, meanwhile, will seek to re-establish their authority and "box out" ex-rebel commanders' continued presence. In the Ivorian town of Séguéla, for instance, an area ruled during the war by the notoriously violent FN zone commander Issiaka Ouattara ("Wattao"), one ex-combatant I interviewed complained that "he [Wattao] has forgotten us. But the chief, the mayor, the Prefect ... they are not welcoming him. So he does not come."<sup>7</sup>

Being differently positioned in terms of their social standing and local elite relations, I expect that commanders with past records of collaborative and predatory rule vary in their abilities to access rebel-ruled localities and mobilize supporters. Areas of collaborative wartime governance are likely to form localized blocks of territorial in-




Figure 1: Accountability theory of ex-rebel commander linkages

fluence, where commander-community linkages persist through the war-to-peace transition. Commanders' ready access to trusted networks and information in these zones — sustained through frequent visits, social calls, and continued provision of services or employment — should in turn allow them to reach back into communities to quickly assemble armed (or potentially armed) individuals as semi-organized militia units (Daly 2016). In contrast, ex-rebel commanders from zones of predatory rule, once physically separated from these communities, should face much steeper barriers to sustaining contact and influence over mobilizable human networks. For these commanders, committing to the formal postwar military hierarchy represents the only viable (though still risky) survival strategy.<sup>8</sup> The theory is diagrammed in Figure 1.

The discussion above suggests a number of testable predictions concerning the relationship between wartime governance practices and ex-commanders' postwar ties to insurgent-controlled communities. These hypotheses are summarized as follows:

**Prediction 1** — *In localities where wartime rule is collaborative (predatory), there will be a higher (lower) probability of ex-rebel commanders having strong social linkages after the postwar transition.*

**Prediction 2** — *In localities where wartime rule is collaborative (predatory), there will be a higher (lower) probability of irregular armed networks persisting after the postwar transition.*

## Research Design and Data Collection

To study the link between patterns of wartime rule and commander-community relations systematically, I created a dataset of formerly rebel-ruled localities in northern Côte d’Ivoire.<sup>9</sup> As part of this data collection, between July and November 2017 I fielded a survey to measure a range of variables related to the rebel occupation and commanders’ networks and influence in the postwar period.<sup>10</sup>

Côte d’Ivoire provides an ideal setting to study wartime rule and postwar commander linkages. Insurgent-civilian interactions varied widely during the conflict, and rebel commanders took on a diverse range of governance roles (Heitz-Tokpa 2013). Originating from an insurrection by army officers in September 2002, the FN capitalized on grievances in northern Côte d’Ivoire against the exclusionary government of Laurent Gbagbo. Within two months, the mutiny metastasised into a rebellion controlling some 60% of the national territory. For nine years the north remained under a parallel system of rebel governance, until an electoral crisis in 2010 triggered the downfall of Gbagbo’s government and a military victory for the FN in April 2011 (Fofana 2011). FN military commanders were thereafter integrated into the national army, assuming a dominant position within the postwar security forces (Martin 2018). Despite efforts by the new government of Alassane Ouattara to professionalize the security sector and reduce the independent power of ex-rebel commanders, in many areas former FN military officers remained essential social and political figures in their former zones of control, and maintain connections to large networks of irregular combatants. In others areas, however, the influence of former rebel commanders withered away (Speight

2016). Examining variation in these outcomes within a single armed movement allows me to hold constant macro- and organization-level factors such as the national political context and the ideology of the insurgent group.

### *Sample Creation*

The purpose of the survey was to collect detailed historical information about rebel-ruled areas: how governance and services worked during the occupation, what kind of presence insurgents established, and the roles of ex-rebel commanders within communities after the end of the civil war. To do so, I collected data at the sub-prefecture level.<sup>11</sup> Under the Forces Nouvelles' system of territorial administration, zone commanders (*com-zones*) divided FN territory into 10 administrative areas that loosely correspond to Côte d'Ivoire's district boundaries. Each zone was further divided in sectors (governed by a *com-secteur*), which roughly aligned with the boundaries of modern sub-prefectures.<sup>12</sup> Beneath sector commanders the rebel administration becomes less defined, making it difficult to measure variables at a more microscopic level. Many types of rebel goods provision — such as regulating land disputes — were centralized at the sub-prefecture level in the hands of the sector commander. To ensure my survey captured meaningful variation on variables of interest, I created a sample of sub-prefectures through a stratified approach.<sup>13</sup> Data was collected from ninety sub-prefectures and five urban *quartiers* in the larger cities of Bouaké and Korhogo.

Ultimately, the sample of localities is reasonably representative of FN-controlled territory in terms of important demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Table 1 compares sub-prefectures from which I collected data to those where I did not. There is no statistically significant difference in terms of population size, the vote-share for President Ouattara's Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) party in the 2010 elections,<sup>14</sup> the average level of household poverty,<sup>15</sup> the level of household exposure to conflict-related losses,<sup>16</sup> or ethnic composition.<sup>17</sup>




Figure 2: The upper image shows the territorial division of Côte d'Ivoire during the civil war (2002–2011). The lower image shows the surveyed localities within FN-controlled territory.

Table 1: Comparing Sampled and Non-Sampled Sub-prefectures in FN Territory

	In Sample (n=90)	Not in Sample (n=129)	P-value from t-test (two-sided)
Population (log)	9.94	9.82	0.28
Vote Share RDR (%)	0.52	0.48	0.12
Households in poverty (%)	0.51	0.54	0.48
Material losses from conflict per household	2.74	2.63	0.72
Ethnicity - Senoufo (%)	0.28	0.22	0.20
Ethnicity - Malinké (%)	0.16	0.13	0.40

### *Informants*

The survey targeted “local historical experts” within each locality. These were key informants – normally traditional authorities, leaders of youth or women’s associations, or civil society leaders — who possessed deep knowledge about local history and the relevant political actors within the community. In each locality, the survey enumerator (myself or a research assistant) interviewed one or, in many cases, multiple such informants in order to fill out the questionnaire.<sup>18</sup>

Interviewing community informants posed both advantages and drawbacks. As repositories of local knowledge, informants were able to respond to questions relating to the entire sub-prefecture (or quartier), and to questions about the interactions between rebel commanders and community authorities. On the other hand, informants tended to be older males, whose knowledge of local history is sure to have blindspots. Informants might also present events in a skewed manner, either to place themselves in a favorable light or to conform to a narrative they expect will attract resources.

To minimize these risks of bias, the questionnaire was designed to capture information considered “common knowledge” among politically informed persons in the community, rather than subjective assessments or opinions. To this end, the questionnaire was refined through multiple rounds of piloting and extensive feedback from Ivorian scholars and an experienced local survey firm.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, we took pains to emphasize to informants that we, as researchers, did not represent any development organization or government, and that the research would only be used for academic purposes. On

the whole, informants were remarkably open and frank, and many relished the opportunity to contribute to the study. In areas where we conducted multiple interviews with different informants at different times, there was a high degree of consistency in how informants recollected key facts.<sup>20</sup>


## **Descriptive Findings**

The collected data provide a rich portrait of how FN commanders built wartime governance institutions and, later, sustained social ties and mobilization power. Before turning to the main analyses, I first discuss how I constructed key measures and illustrate variation in my explanatory and outcome variables.<sup>21</sup>


### ***Explanatory Variables: Collaborative and Predatory Rule***

I measure collaborative rule in two main ways: the provision of goods and services by the FN, and the existence of mechanisms for rebel-civilian dialogue.<sup>22</sup> Throughout rebel-occupied territory, FN involvement in service provision varied widely by sector (Figure 3 (a)). Policing and security functions were fairly universal: in 90% and 82% of sampled localities, FN rebels were the primary actor involved in policing against criminality (including issuing sentences through informal “courts”) and protecting the community from external attacks, respectively. By contrast, commanders were involved in regulating issues of land governance and property disputes in only 54% of localities. And less frequently, rebel commanders provided direct assistance to the education sector (e.g. donations for schools and teachers), health care services (e.g. recruitment of doctors and donations for clinics), local infrastructure (e.g. repairing roads and bridges), and providing loans for local businesses and traders.<sup>23</sup> Figure 3 (b) shows the distribution of these indicators expressed as an aggregated index (*Rebel Goods Provision*).

In parallel with these direct forms of goods provision, FN wartime rule also relied on the active collaboration of local civilians, and especially community elites. These



(a) FN provision of goods by sector




(b) Rebel Goods Provision (index receives one point for each good provided by FN rebels within locality during 2002-2011 occupation)

Figure 3: Wartime Goods Provision by Forces Nouvelles


elites included traditional and customary authorities such as village and canton chiefs, school teachers and municipal civil servants, leaders of non-government organizations, and political party branch members. For example, in 75 of 95 surveyed localities (79%), informants reported that “traditional authorities or other important persons in the community” regularly negotiated or actively collaborated with the efforts of occupying rebels to provide basic order and governance. Such negotiations concerned a range of issues, from complaints about the comportment of rebel soldiers, to the organizing of schools and health care clinics, or raising funds for road repairs. An especially important mechanism for rebel-civilian dialogue was the practice of organizing public meetings chaired by the local commander or his representative. Such meetings, attended by village leaders but also ordinary residents, were significant because they “provided an important platform for face-to-face interactions, an important means of building trust.”<sup>24</sup> In a majority of localities (60%), survey informants indicated that local commanders organized such meetings regularly (i.e. on weekly or monthly basis) to mediate disputes and grant community members the opportunity to express demands and grievances (*Organized Meetings*).

To account for predatory governance practices, I measure the degree of FN violence against civilians, material dispossession, and the prevalence of rebel-civilian conflict. The most common form of violence reported by informants was aggression by rebels against unarmed civilians (76% of localities), followed by government-rebel combat (25%) and intra-communal violence (15%). Civilian victimization was distributed bi-modally: about a quarter of localities reported no instances of aggression against unarmed civilians, another quarter reported “more than one hundred” cases, with the remainder in between. The majority of localities (81%) also reported experiencing pillage and looting at the hands of rebel forces, while in 78% informants indicated that significant tensions arose between community members and the FN either “occasionally” or “frequently” due to the misbehavior of rebel soldiers. These indicators are summarized in the measure *Predation Index*, shown in Figure 4.

It is worth noting at the outset that these varied patterns of collaboration and



(a) Rebel predation outcomes. Physical Violence is a binary indicator of whether civilians were physically victimized by FN forces. Pillage/Looting is a binary indicator of whether FN forces pillaged in the locality. Civilian/Insurgent Tensions indicates whether tensions between civilians and insurgents resulting from insurgent mistreatment of residents was reported as either “occasional” or “frequent”.



(b) Predation Index. The index receives one point for each of Physical Violence and Pillage/Looting. The index receives one point if Civilian/Insurgent Tensions were “occasional” and two points if Civilian/Insurgent Tensions were “frequent” (and zero otherwise).

Figure 4: Wartime Predation by Forces Nouvelles

predation are not simply a function of whether or not rebel commanders themselves were native residents of the locality. Commanding FN officers within surveyed localities were almost *always* outsiders to the communities they controlled; in only 12% of localities did informants identify the local FN commander during the occupation as a prior resident of the department. This likely reflects a deliberate effort by FN leaders to station officers and their troops outside of their home areas.<sup>25</sup>

### ***Outcome Variable: Postwar Commander Linkages***

I now turn to the main outcome of interest: the postwar linkages between ex-rebel commanders and the communities they ruled during the conflict. Not surprisingly, measuring the presence of irregular armed networks affiliated with ex-rebel commanders poses a significant challenge. Such networks may be clandestine and cannot always be observed even by knowledgeable and honest community informants. Survey questions therefore focused primarily on readily observable indicators of commanders' social, political, and economic presence within the locality, working on the assumption that such indicators are a strong signal of commanders' ability to contact and recruit potential supporters. I complement this approach by examining more direct measures of irregular armed networks from the 2013 Afrobarometer survey.


Ex-rebel commanders in northern Côte d'Ivoire retained multifaceted forms of influence within local communities, albeit with great variation. In some areas, consistent with the popular image of ex-rebel officers as entrenched "warlords" (Marten 2012), commanders sustained illicit, profit-oriented networks of resource extraction. For example, in a handful of areas such as Séguéla and Dabakala, FN-turned-FRCI commanders maintained control over diamond and gold mining operations, which compete directly with legal state-owned enterprises (Bavier 2015). In approximately 30% of surveyed localities, petty forms of extortion and taxation at informal road checkpoints by former rebel soldiers also persisted during the first two years following the 2011 transition. However, such practices were quite rare by the time of survey enumeration in 2017 (6% of surveyed localities), indicating that such predatory behaviors tended to wither away

with time.


By contrast, the more durable basis for ex-rebel commanders' postwar power was through layered forms of social and political connection. In over half (53%) of the localities surveyed, former FN commanders had continued to make regular visits to the community in a private capacity since 2011 (*Commander Visits*). The purpose of such visits ranged from attending ceremonial events (such as marriages, funerals, and religious celebrations), visiting the homes of traditional authorities, and in some cases bringing donations to local development projects such as schools, health clinics, or mosques. Among localities that received such private visits from commanders, in over half of them (52%) commanders were known to provide material support – such as food, spending money, and jobs – directly to their former armed supporters or youth (*Material Support*). And in over a third of surveyed localities (38%), community members continued to call on the former FN commander to help resolve problems of criminality and public order after the 2011 transition (*Provides Order*). I combine these indicators into a 4-level summary index, *Postwar Commander Influence*, shown in Figure 5 (b). Finally, in a majority of localities (58%) a former rebel group member occupied a formal political office, such as legislative deputy, mayor or deputy-mayor, regional councillor, or another type of bureaucratic post (*Political Position*).<sup>26</sup>

## Analysis and Results

To summarize the discussion so far, evidence from a representative sample of rebel-ruled localities shows that the Forces Nouvelles engaged in a wide variety of governance practices of both a collaborative and predatory nature, and that some commanders sustained strong postwar networks and influence within these territories. But do wartime governance practices account for why some commanders maintained strong linkages while others did not? This section tests the empirical predictions of the accountability theory of postwar commander-community linkages, and finds strong support for the argument.



(a) Postwar Rebel-Community Linkages.



(b) Postwar Commander Influence (index receives one point for each of Commander Visits (0/1), Material Support (0/1) and Provides Order (0/1)).

Figure 5: Postwar Rebel-Community Linkages

### *Commander-Community Linkages after the 2011 Transition*

According to Prediction 1, postwar commander-community linkages should be strongest in areas where insurgents responded to citizen interests by providing goods and services and institutionalizing mechanisms of rebel-civilian dialogue. On first inspection of a simple scatterplot (Figure 6), the link between rebel goods provision and commanders' postwar influence appears clear: localities tend to have a higher number of postwar ties to ex-rebel commanders where FN rebels provided more services during the occupation. Moreover, many cases that appear near the line-of-best-fit meet the basic plausibility test: Man and Korhogo, for example, two areas where the Forces Nouvelles' wartime governance has been documented extensively (Heitz-Tokpa 2013; Speight 2016), both appear in the upper-right quadrant. By contrast, sub-prefectures such as Krofoinsou and Blapleu, where FN rebels brutalized civilian populations and did little to provide basic services, are located in the bottom-left.

To account for potential confounding variables, I include a number of covariates that may also affect postwar commander-community linkages. First, to account for the accessibility of localities and the size of potential mobilization networks, I control for logged population size, an index of the number of government infrastructure services available within the locality,<sup>27</sup> and whether or not the locality is accessible by a paved road. Second, I include a dummy variable for whether the primary ethnic group within the locality is Senoufo or Malinké (*Northern Ethnicity*). Since almost all FN commanders were themselves of *nordiste* origins, localities with a large proportion of residents from these groups may be more favorable terrain for the continued influence of former FN commanders due to co-ethnic affinity. Finally, to account for the strategic importance of the territory, I include binary indicators for whether armed combat between organized military forces occurred in the locality and whether the FN recruited fighters during the civil war.

While I conceptualize wartime governance on a spectrum, for purposes of transparency I analyze each measure of collaborative and predatory rule separately. As we can see in Table 2, which shows the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression



model with *Postwar Commander Influence* as the outcome variable, rebel investment in collaborative wartime governance has a substantial positive impact on commanders' postwar community linkages. Models 1 and 2 show that a one-unit increase in the number of wartime goods provided by FN rebels is associated with an average increase in the postwar commander influence index of approximately 0.3 ( $p < 0.01$ ). This effect size is roughly comparable in magnitude to the effect of doubling the population size of a locality. Models 3, 4 and 7 include *Organized Meetings* as an alternative measure of the quality of wartime rule. Once again we see that this indicator of collaborative governance is a strong predictor of commanders' postwar influence: across all models the coefficient is positive and statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ).

Next, I examine the effects of predatory wartime rule in Models 5, 6 and 7. Popular narratives in Côte d'Ivoire suggest that rebel commanders who focused most intensely on self-enrichment and predation of civilians have retained the most influence following the postwar transition (Bavier 2015). By contrast, my accountability theory predicts that predatory rule should lead to *weaker* postwar commander-community ties, as residents and community elites reject the continued presence of abusive ex-rebel commanders over time. Consistent with my expectation, the variable *Predation Index* is indeed negatively associated with postwar commander influence (though the coefficient is not statistically significant after controlling for population).

In terms of other covariates, population size and the presence of government infrastructure are consistently positive predictors of postwar commander-community linkages, suggesting that commanders sought to retain ties in areas with greater development and larger networks of human resources. Meanwhile, binary indicators for northern ethno-linguistic group, armed combat, and recruitment appear to have no statistically significant association with postwar commander linkages.

To further sort out the relationship between insurgent wartime governance and commanders' postwar linkages, Table 3 shows the results of binomial logistic regression models, examining the disaggregated components of commander influence. Models 1 and 2 estimate the probability of *Commander Visits*. Consistent with the findings

Table 2: Determinants of Postwar Commander Influence (OLS)

	Dependent variable: Postwar Commander Influence Index						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<b>WARTIME VARIABLES</b>							
Rebel Goods Provision	0.328*** (0.093)	0.293*** (0.095)					0.239** (0.097)
Organized Meetings			0.450** (0.212)	0.656*** (0.212)			0.475** (0.219)
Predation Index					-0.182* (0.094)	-0.111 (0.109)	-0.094 (0.102)
Combat	-0.143 (0.233)	-0.199 (0.240)	-0.051 (0.242)	-0.164 (0.240)	0.012 (0.246)	-0.112 (0.261)	-0.127 (0.242)
Recruitment	0.403 (0.305)	0.202 (0.323)	0.521 (0.317)	0.188 (0.324)	0.665** (0.307)	0.424 (0.330)	0.008 (0.323)
<b>OTHER VARIABLES</b>							
Population (ln)		0.285* (0.147)		0.470*** (0.151)		0.309* (0.157)	0.356** (0.156)
Infrastructure Index	0.214*** (0.067)	0.136* (0.076)	0.267*** (0.067)	0.113 (0.078)	0.302*** (0.067)	0.206** (0.081)	0.114 (0.080)
Paved Road	0.047 (0.235)	-0.012 (0.245)	0.129 (0.244)	-0.010 (0.245)	0.128 (0.245)	0.065 (0.258)	-0.019 (0.239)
Ethnicity Northern	-0.100 (0.211)	-0.021 (0.223)	-0.233 (0.216)	-0.124 (0.219)	-0.368 (0.227)	-0.214 (0.236)	-0.066 (0.222)
Constant	-1.002*** (0.353)	-3.178** (1.276)	-0.916** (0.368)	-4.588*** (1.310)	-0.441 (0.448)	-3.011** (1.447)	-3.497** (1.428)
Observations	93	87	93	87	93	87	87
R <sup>2</sup>	0.434	0.425	0.384	0.425	0.379	0.364	0.470
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.394	0.375	0.341	0.375	0.335	0.308	0.408

Notes: Dependent variable is a summary index of *Commander Visits*, *Material Support*, and *Provides Order*. Statistical significance: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

reported above, the index of rebel goods provision is a positive and statistically significant predictor of private visits from former FN commanders ( $p < 0.05$ ). *Organized Meetings* is also a positive predictor, although it barely reaches statistical significance at the  $p < 0.1$  level. *Predation Index* is not statistically significant, but the negative coefficient points in the expected direction.

Looking to Models 3 and 4, which estimate the probability of *Material Support*, the coefficients for the wartime governance variables again point in the expected direction, although none reach statistical significance. In part this is likely a problem of statistical

Table 3: Components of Commander-Community Linkages (Logit)

	Dependent variable:							
	Commander Visits (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
WARTIME VARIABLES								
Rebel Goods Provision	0.850** (0.344)	0.842** (0.387)	0.287 (0.283)	0.176 (0.301)	0.711** (0.286)	0.664** (0.309)	0.899*** (0.341)	0.796** (0.350)
Organized Meetings	0.706 (0.567)	1.306* (0.675)	0.755 (0.669)	0.996 (0.748)	-0.159 (0.561)	0.220 (0.621)	0.242 (0.616)	0.578 (0.656)
Predation Index	-0.151 (0.251)	-0.003 (0.305)	-0.273 (0.264)	-0.087 (0.327)	-0.058 (0.228)	-0.064 (0.270)	-0.649** (0.282)	-0.517* (0.307)
Combat	-1.406* (0.773)	-1.644* (0.847)	0.877 (0.713)	0.647 (0.763)	-2.778*** (0.831)	-2.503*** (0.878)	-0.047 (0.758)	-0.135 (0.771)
Recruitment	1.211 (0.977)	0.227 (1.064)	0.144 (1.227)	-0.681 (1.263)	0.430 (0.877)	0.650 (1.026)	17.206 (1,574.050)	16.120 (1,774.581)
OTHER VARIABLES								
Population (ln)		1.058** (0.540)		0.587 (0.531)		0.725 (0.470)		0.727 (0.522)
Infrastructure Index	0.339* (0.189)	0.049 (0.249)	0.519** (0.220)	0.346 (0.262)	0.171 (0.182)	-0.039 (0.235)	0.469** (0.203)	0.251 (0.238)
Paved Road	0.654 (0.635)	0.622 (0.684)	-0.108 (0.718)	-0.367 (0.793)	-0.256 (0.621)	-0.391 (0.678)	-0.177 (0.647)	-0.419 (0.723)
Ethnicity Northern	-1.047 (0.680)	-0.426 (0.734)	0.327 (0.692)	0.477 (0.721)	-0.828 (0.598)	-0.577 (0.647)	-0.295 (0.666)	0.008 (0.702)
Constant	-3.965*** (1.438)	-12.923** (5.213)	-5.107*** (1.633)	-9.545* (4.874)	-2.000* (1.156)	-8.437* (4.351)	-20.571 (1,574.051)	-25.915 (1,774.587)
Observations	93	87	93	87	93	87	93	87
Log Likelihood	-42.885	-38.630	-40.809	-38.318	-50.181	-45.457	-40.005	-38.322

Notes: Statistical significance: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

power, since there is a relatively small amount of variation in the outcome variable (*Material Support* takes a value of 1 in only twenty-five surveyed localities). However, in Models 5 and 6, which estimate the likelihood of *Provides Order*, we see that the rebel goods index is again positive and statistically significant ( $p < 0.05$ ). In localities with more extensive wartime rebel goods provision, community leaders were more likely to call on former FN commanders to intervene to restore order and address criminality, a strong signal of commanders' continued influence.

Finally, in Models 7 and 8, I estimate the likelihood of *Political Position*. As expected, the rebel goods index is positive and statistically significant. Former FN rebels were more likely to hold formal political positions where insurgents had effective records of wartime service provision. By contrast, *Predation Index* has a significantly negative association ( $p < 0.1$ ). This accords with the idea that in areas where rebel rulership involved greater predation and coercion, armed group members *lost* political capital and were less likely to remain welcome public figures in the area.

### ***Irregular Armed Networks after the 2011 Transition***

While my postwar outcome measures capture an array of important social and political linkages between ex-FN commanders and local communities, for practical reasons the survey could not directly measure the presence or size of irregular armed networks affiliated with ex-rebel commanders. To corroborate the link between wartime governance and the persistence of such networks (Prediction 2), I examine data from the 2013 Afrobarometer survey in Côte d'Ivoire concerning the rate of citizens' reported encounters with non-state armed actors. Specifically, I consider the question: "How many times in the last 12 months have you encountered non-state armed actors who demanded payment for protection for your community?" ["Once", "A Few Times", "Often" or "Never"]. In areas where a higher proportion of respondents report that they have encountered these armed actors at least once, we can infer a heavier presence of semi-organized networks of ex-combatants. Although the sample of localities covered by these data is too small to perform statistical tests, I nevertheless examine the


bivariate associations between my measures of rebel goods provision, rebel predation, and postwar rates of reported encounters with non-state armed actors, shown in Figure 7. I average all variables at the commune level.

While the small sample size and lack of control variables necessitate caution in making inferences, the trend is clear: citizens in communes and departments that experienced greater wartime goods provision by FN rebels were *more* likely to report encounters with non-state armed actors in 2012-2013, while citizens in communes and departments that experienced higher wartime predation were *less* likely. This pattern provides further evidence that collaborative wartime institution-building provided the basis for ex-rebel commanders to retain access to extra-military armed networks.


### ***Addressing Endogeneity***

To this point, I have treated patterns of wartime rebel governance as an exogenous phenomenon, with initial variation arising from factors such as the idiosyncratic leadership of individual commanders or the early interactions between insurgents and civilians that create path-dependent relationships of collaboration or resistance ([Weinstein 2007](#)). But in order to interpret the association between wartime governance practices and postwar commander-community linkages in a causal manner, it is important to consider why the quality of rebel-rule varies across location. Skeptics could argue, for example, that commanders with “good governance” skills might be assigned to areas that are more receptive to the rebel occupation, while more “predatory” commanders are assigned to areas that are hostile to insurgents. Alternatively, one might assume that commanders who arrive in areas initially sympathetic to the insurgency — and also more favorable to sustained ties with commanders over time — will find that they are able to collaborate with local gatekeepers and provide goods more easily.

Underlying these concerns is the assumption that wartime governance practices are linked to pre-war political sentiments within communities, and that commanders who operate within politically sympathetic areas will be more likely to practice collaborative governance. To address this endogeneity threat, I examine the determinants of



(a) Rebel Goods Provision: Commune-level



(b) Rebel Predation: Commune-level

Figure 7: Bivariate associations between *Rebel Goods Index* and *Predation Index* and the presence of irregular armed networks two years after the end of the civil war, using commune-level averages. The y-axis is the percentage of survey respondents who reported “Once”, “A Few Times”, or “Often” (instead of “Never”) to the question: “How many times in the last 12 months have you encountered non-state armed actors who demanded payment for protection for your community?” Source: Afrobarometer Round 5, 2013.

collaborative rule by the FN. To measure likely pro-rebel political support, I use data on the ethnic demography of each locality. Specifically, I measure the proportion of the population that identify as belonging to either the Malinké or Senoufo ethnic groups. These groups, sometimes lumped together under the label of *nordistes*, were widely seen during the Ivorian civil war as the support base for both the RDR party and for the armed rebellion against the Gbagbo regime (Akindès 2004; McGovern 2011). While acknowledging the risk of over-essentializing these ascriptive identities, given the high political salience of ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire since the mid 1990s I consider this to be the best available measure of the likely prewar political support for the FN at the time of rebel arrival.

In addition to ethnic demography, rebel incentives to invest in collaborative governance may be affected by population size and development levels, which shape opportunities for recruitment and taxation. I therefore include control variables for population size, infrastructure, and paved road accessibility. I also control for the variable *Combat*, as rebel governance tactics may be affected by the strategic importance of the territory (Arjona 2016).<sup>28</sup>

Results from linear regression models estimating the correlates of *Rebel Goods Provision* and *Organized Meetings* appear in Figure 8. The models show that collaborative governance is *not* predicted by favorable demography. In fact, the estimated coefficient for *Ethnicity Northern (%)* is negative in both models: in areas where a greater share of households identified as Senoufo or Malinké, informants reported that FN rebels were involved in the provision of fewer services for the community ( $p < 0.05$ ).

What accounts for this apparently puzzling pattern? While a full investigation lies beyond the scope of this article, one explanation appears plausible: occupying FN commanders invested in collaborative governance according to the expected relative payoff. Because overall territorial contestation was low for most of the Ivorian conflict due to the presence of a peacekeeping force that protected rebel territory from government counterattack, many FN commanders could count on the support of *nordiste* stronghold communities without exerting significant resources to govern effectively or




Figure 8: Determinants of FN collaborative rule, linear regression ( $n = 87$ ). Lines show 95 percent confidence intervals.

respond to local community needs (Speight 2016). In contrast, incentives for collaborative rule were higher in non-*nordiste* communities, where residents' support for the FN was more contingent on governance performance. This explanation is consistent with the accountability-based framework put forward in this article, as well as the view that internal conflicts are a form of "competitive statebuilding," wherein states and insurgents compete with scarce resources to maximize civilian compliance (Staniland 2012).

In sum, while one might presume that collaborative governance occurs in areas where pre-existing political sentiments are already favorable to rebel commanders, the evidence from my dataset does not support this claim. Instead, it supports the view that rebels invested in collaborative governance in "hard cases" where the relative payoff of local goods provision was highest. Since a lack of initial pro-rebel support seems very unlikely to be a cause of strong postwar commander-community linkages, we can therefore be more confident that wartime governance practices are doing the explanatory work.

### ***Additional Robustness Checks***

The fact that the outcome variables measured on the survey were always asked later in the interview raises potential concerns about ordering effects. I conducted a separate analysis to corroborate the finding that in areas where collaborative rule laid the foundations for enduring commander-community linkages, ex-rebel commanders continued to "substitute" for the state and provide security. I use data from the 2014 ENV household quality of life survey to analyze citizen uptake of police services in areas covered by my community informant survey ( $n = 2,724$ ): if communities have enduring linkages to ex-rebel commanders, we should see less citizen reliance on the regular police force in these areas. The appendix contains a description of this data and full statistical results. The analyses confirm that, even after accounting for a large number of potential confounders, there is a significant negative association between the strength of commander-community linkages (as measured on my survey) and household-head use

of police services (as measured on the ENV survey): respondents in areas with strong commander-community linkages were approximately 3 percentage points less likely [-0.01, -0.05] to report visiting the police commissariat than respondents in areas with weak ex-rebel commander linkages.

In further robustness checks, I introduce additional control variables and substitute alternative measures of collaborative governance. For the baseline models in Table 2, I control for continuous measures of ethnic demography, measures of war-related violence and household poverty from the 2008 ENV survey, the socio-political cohesion of localities as measured through “block voting” in the 2011 legislative and 2013 municipal elections, the presence of mining activity, and geographic variables including department fixed-effects (accounting for potential spatial dependence among neighboring localities) and distance from the ceasefire zone. As an alternative measure of collaborative rule, I construct dummy variables for whether local elites mediated with FN forces to resolve disputes, collaborated with FN forces to provide services, or actively supported the FN politically. I also construct an indicator of rebel goods provision limited to Policing and Protection, to verify the findings are not driven only by security-related services. Finally, I construct a spectrum-based index of collaborative rule that incorporates all three measures of *Rebel Goods Provision*, *Organized Meetings*, and *Predation Index*.

Across all of these robustness checks, the key findings of this article were upheld. The inclusion of the additional control variables did not substantially change the relationship between wartime rule indicators and postwar commander influence. The presence of a mining site in the sub-prefecture was positively associated with postwar commander influence, however, suggesting that economic incentives may also affect where ex-rebel commanders maintain power. The indicators for local leader collaboration were positively and significantly associated with strong postwar commander linkages, as was the spectrum-based measure of collaborative rule. The security-only indicator of rebel goods provision was not significantly associated with postwar commander influence, suggesting an important break between “security only” and “security

plus” for whether FN commanders established lasting local alliances.

## Conclusion

This article has argued that understanding the social bases of ex-rebel commanders’ power and influence in post-conflict states demands an appreciation of wartime dynamics and the agency of local communities to reward or punish commanders in response to their past governance performance. The overwhelming weight of the evidence across varied data sources and measures supports this accountability-based theory. In localities where rebel occupiers demonstrated concern for the well-being of populations by providing public goods and organizing regular face-to-face meetings, commanders were able to reach back into these communities to exercise influence and sustain support networks. By contrast, where the FN occupation took a more predatory tone, commanders were less likely to retain strong ties to these areas after their integration into the army, and consequently lost some of their access to extra-military networks. Ironically, these “predatory” commanders serve today as more reliable officers of the Ivorian military, while ex-rebel commanders who acquired local social capital during the civil war are capable of threatening the regime they put in power ([Martin 2018](#)).

While this article has drawn on evidence from the case of Côte d’Ivoire, similar dynamics abound in conflict-torn states like South Sudan ([Podder 2014](#)), Afghanistan ([Malejacq 2016](#)), and the Central African Republic ([Carayannis and Lombard 2015](#)). Given the limited capacity of central governments in these states to provide essential services, it is perhaps inevitable that some ex-rebel commanders will sustain authority and influence that go well beyond their formal job descriptions as military officers. The alternative may be a vacuum of political order and goods provision, with worse outcomes for human security and development ([Blair and Kalmanovitz 2016](#)). In many ways, the position of these ex-rebel commanders is comparable to that of the feudal barons in early-modern European polities, who used their independent bases of mobilization power to create limited domains of social order and bargain with central rulers

to constrain the privileges of the sovereign (Tilly 1993; Blaydes and Chaney 2013). Over time, center-periphery bargaining between governments and regionally-embedded commanders could produce similar pathways to state consolidation, for instance through compacted federations among territorial subunits (Ziblatt 2004).

Yet this article underscores that permitting military actors to acquire strong local linkages also comes with significant risks in the short-to-medium term. If ex-rebel commanders can threaten to mobilize private armed networks against the government to extract monetary concessions or protect themselves from criminal prosecution, then the very legitimacy of the state and its right to rule will be called into question. And once militant group commanders become empowered with strong vertical linkages, external actors will have little leverage to later compel them to obey civilian rulers or commit to a unified and professional military. Policy actors looking to stabilize post-conflict states should therefore account for these commander-community ties — which often persist out of view of external media coverage — as serious risk factors for ex-combatant remobilization and as potential barriers to rebuilding citizen confidence in central governments.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Bernard (pseudonym). Interview with the author. Sangouiné, November 19 2017.

<sup>2</sup>Eric (pseudonym). Interview with the author. Mahapleu, November 20 2017.

<sup>3</sup>Charles (pseudonym), member of demobilized soldiers' association. Interview with the author. Sangouiné, August 3 2017; Djehe Claude, Sous-Prefet of Man. Interview with the author. Man, August 8 2017.

<sup>4</sup>Joseph (pseudonym), demobilized soldier. Interview with the author. Mahapleu, November 18 2017.

<sup>5</sup>Djehe Claude, Sous-Prefet of Man. Interview with the author. Man, August 8 2017.

<sup>6</sup>This proposition – central to the hearts and minds doctrine of counterinsurgency – has long been appreciated by insurgent leaders. See for example Guevara (2006) and Tse-tung (2012).

<sup>7</sup>John (pseudonym), member of ex-combatant association. Interview with the author. Séguéla, July 31 2017.

<sup>8</sup>Even predatory and unpopular commanders may attempt to purchase private armed supporters in a purely transactional manner. However, such cases are likely to be exceptional. Within the FRCI mid-ranking officers generally do not possess the resources to consistently auto-finance extra-military networks.

<sup>9</sup>Past studies have documented Forces Nouvelles governance within specific towns, but none have gathered data systematically across localities. See for example Heitz-Tokpa (2013) and

Speight (2016).

<sup>10</sup>The survey was designed in collaboration with Giulia Piccolino and Jeremy Speight.

<sup>11</sup>There are 511 sub-prefectures in Côte d'Ivoire since 2013, with a median population size of 23,117.

<sup>12</sup>In some cases, multiple sub-prefectures fell under the control of a single sector commander.

<sup>13</sup>Details of the sample construction can be found in the accompanying appendix.

<sup>14</sup>Source: Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) of Côte d'Ivoire.

<sup>15</sup>Source: Quality of Life Household Survey (Enquete sur le niveau de vie des menages en Côte d'Ivoire (ENV)), National Institute of Statistics, Government of Côte d'Ivoire, Abidjan, 2008.

<sup>16</sup>Source: ENV 2008.

<sup>17</sup>Source: ENV 2014.

<sup>18</sup>After each interview, the interviewer rated the perceived knowledgeability, sincerity, and level of comprehension of the informant on a three point scale (“low”, “medium”, “high”). If any of these ratings were scored “low”, we would conduct a second interview with a different informant.

<sup>19</sup>I am grateful to Abel Gbala, Bakary Soro, Arthur Banga, Joseph Koné, Francois Defourny, and the Centre de Recherche et de Formation sur le Développement Intégré in Abidjan.

<sup>20</sup>In the Air France quartier of Korhogo, survey interviews with twelve separate informants — conducted by three different interviewers — yielded practically identical responses to questions concerning patterns of wartime rule and postwar roles of commanders.

<sup>21</sup>English-language translations of questions used to construct key variables appear in the appendix. The full questionnaire is available at: <https://www.philipandrewmartin.com>

<sup>22</sup>I conceptualize rebel goods provision and the existence of regular meetings for rebel-civilian dialogue as indicators of the same underlying concept. The indicators are strongly correlated ( $r = 0.35$ ).

<sup>23</sup>Informants were asked to indicate whether these services were provided to all community members, not only members of their own ethnic group or tribe.

<sup>24</sup>Kathrin Heitz-Tokpa. Interview with the author. Bingerville, Côte d'Ivoire, November 5 2017.

<sup>25</sup>Assigning officials outside their home area is not new in Côte d'Ivoire. For example, government Prefects are regularly rotated across territories. Thanks to Kathrin Heitz-Tokpa for raising this point.

<sup>26</sup>Higher ranking FN officers — such as comzones and comsecteurs — usually took military positions and did not occupy political posts themselves. Rather, members of the FN political branch normally filled such positions. Thus, I do not include this measure in the index of commander influence. However, including this indicator does not significantly alter the analysis.

<sup>27</sup>See appendix for details.

<sup>28</sup>Results are similar when controlling for the distance to the ceasefire zone.

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# Supplementary Appendix

Ex-Rebel Commanders and Postwar Statebuilding: Subnational Evidence from Côte  
d'Ivoire

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# 1 Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics

## 1.1 Independent and Dependent Variables

*Commander visits:* Coded as 1 if a former FN commander who governed the sub-prefecture between 2002 and 2011 visited the sub-prefecture after Alassane Ouattara became president in April 2011. Source: Informant interviews.

*Material support:* Coded as 1 if the ex-FN commander provided material assistance to residents of the sub-prefecture since the end of the war in 2011. Forms of support include gifts or offerings to community leaders or individuals, pocket money, or employment. Source: Informant interviews.

*Provides order:* Coded as 1 if the ex-FN commander was involved in the provision of policing and/or protection services for the community after the electoral crisis in 2011. Source: Informant interviews.

*Political position:* Coded as 1 if any former FN member in the sub-prefecture was elected or appointed to the positions of: Deputy to National Assembly, mayor or adjoint-mayor, regional councillor, other civil servant position, member of local party branch, member of local NGO or civil society group. Source: Informant interviews.

*Postwar commander influence index:* Sum of Leader Visits, Material Support, and Provides Order.

*Rebel goods provision:* Sum of the number of service sectors in the sub-prefecture in which the FN was identified as a primary provider between 2002 and 2011. Services include: maintaining order/policing, protecting community from external attacks, land governance, education, health care, infrastructure maintenance, and economic loans/credit. Source: Informant interviews.

*Organized meetings:* Coded as 1 if the FN commander or an FN representative organized regular public meetings (once per month or more) in the sub-prefecture, either to explain their political goals to the population, communicate information from the FN leadership, or allow residents to raise grievances. Source: Informant interviews.

*Physical violence:* Coded as 1 if civilians in the sub-prefecture were victims of physical violence or abuse between 2002 and 2011 by the FN. Source: Informant interviews.

*Pillage:* Coded as 1 if pillage or looting occurred in the sous-prefecture between 2002 and 2011. Source: Informant interviews.

*Civilian/Insurgent tensions:* Coded as 1 if tensions and/or conflict between civilians and FN

forces in the sub-prefectures were “occasional” or “frequent”. Source: Informant interviews.

*Predation index*: Index from 0 to 4 that receives 1 point if Physical Violence equals 1, 1 point if Pillage equals 1, 1 point if Civilian/Insurgent tensions were occasional and 2 points if Civilian/Insurgent tensions were frequent.

*Leaders mediated disputes with FN*: Coded as 1 if any local community elites in the sub-prefecture engaged with FN commanders to resolve problems of FN rebel behavior. Source: Informant interviews.

*Leaders provided services with FN*: Coded as 1 if any local community elites in the sub-prefecture cooperated with the FN commander to provide services and basic goods, such as nutrition, health care, education, or access to humanitarian aid. Source: Informant interviews.

*Leaders supported FN politically*: Coded as 1 if any local community elites in the sub-prefecture expressed active support for the political agenda and military efforts of the rebellion. Source: Informant interviews.

*Collaborative governance spectrum*: An index of rebel wartime rule, ranging from -1 to 2. The index adds one point if *Rebel Goods Provision* is above its median value of 2, adds one point if *Organized Meetings* is 1, and subtracts 1 point if *Predation Index* is above its median value of 3.

## 1.2 Control Variables

*Population*: Sub-prefecture population. Source: Institut National de la Statistique (INS), General Household Population Survey (RGPH) 2014.

*Infrastructure index*: A summary index measuring the presence of key service infrastructure in the sub-prefecture, ranging from 0 to 6. Services included are: Prefecture, Mairie, Gendarmerie/Police Station, Health Clinic, Secondary School, Bank. Source: Informant interviews.

*Paved road*: Coded 1 if the seat of the sub-prefecture is accessible by paved road. Source: Author.

*Ethnicity northern*: Coded 1 if the principal ethnic group residing in the sub-prefecture is Senoufo or Malinke. Source: Informant interviews.

*Combat*: Coded 1 if armed confrontations between organized military forces occurred in the sub-prefecture between 2002 and 2011. Source: Informant interviews.

*Recruitment*: Coded 1 if people in the sub-prefecture were recruited by the Forces Nouvelles between 2002 and 2011. Source: Informant interviews.

*Block voting index*: The vote share of the winning party within the electoral constituency, averaged over the 2011 legislative and 2013 municipal elections. Source: Commission Electorale Independante.

*Mining site*: Coded as 1 if there is mining activity in the sub-prefecture. Source: Informant interviews.

*Vote share RDR*: The proportion of votes cast for the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR) party in the 2013 municipal elections. Source: Commission Electorale Independante.

*Ethnicity northern (%)*: The percentage of household heads in the sub-prefecture who identify as Senoufo or Malinke. Source: ENV 2014.

*Household poverty (%)*: The percentage of household heads in the sub-prefecture who live below the national poverty line. Source: ENV 2014.

*Household victimization (%)*: The average number of conflict-related harms experienced by individual households in the sub-prefecture. Potential harms include: individual was displaced from their home, individual faced diminished revenue, individual had property damaged, individual had to hide for an extended period of time, individual lost their crop fields, individual lost an animal, individual lost other economic assets, individual is currently displaced, individual has nightmares as a result of the conflict, individual experiences anxiety as a result of the conflict, an individual in the household was killed due to the conflict, or an individual experienced a malady due to the conflict.

*Distance to ceasefire zone*: The distance in kilometers from the sub-prefecture to the nearest point of the ceasefire zone. This distance was calculated using a nearest-target-point Distance Matrix in QGIS for the ceasefire zone and each locality polygon.

Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics for Outcome and Explanatory Variables

	N obs	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.
Commander visits	94	0	1	1	0.54	0.50
Material support	93	0	1	0	0.27	0.45
Provides order	95	0	1	0	0.39	0.49
Political position	95	0	1	0	0.38	0.49
Postwar commander influence index	93	0	4	1	1.57	1.35
Rebel goods provision	95	0	6	3	2.74	1.33
Organized meetings	95	0	1	1	0.59	0.49
Physical violence	95	0	1	1	0.76	0.43
Pillage	95	0	1	1	0.81	0.39
Civilian/Insurgent tensions	95	0	1	1	0.78	0.42
Predation index	95	0	4	3	2.53	1.16
Leaders mediated disputes with FN	95	0	1	1	0.79	0.41
Leaders provided services with FN	95	0	1	0	0.25	0.44
Leaders supported FN politically	95	0	1	0	0.12	0.32
Collaborative governance spectrum	95	-1	2	1	0.73	0.89

Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics for Control Variables

	N obs	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.
Population (ln)	89	7.85	12.15	10.02	9.94	0.88
Infrastructure index	93	2	8	5	5.48	1.86
Paved road	95	0	1	0	0.49	0.50
Ethnicity northern	95	0	1	1	0.58	0.50
Combat	95	0	1	0	0.25	0.44
Recruitment	95	0	1	1	0.87	0.33
Block voting index	91	30.95	91.45	56.60	59.54	13.52
Mining site	95	0	1	0	0.11	0.31
Vote share RDR	87	6.02	100	46.40	52.42	24.21
Ethnicity northern (%)	80	0	1	0.32	0.44	0.40
Household poverty (%)	48	0	1	0.52	0.51	0.26
Household victimization (%)	47	0.55	6.78	2.16	2.74	1.60
Distance to ceasefire zone	95	0.07	3.10	1.30	1.29	0.77

## 2 Sample Creation

The sampling frame consisted of the 219 current sub-prefectures in areas that were controlled by the Forces Nouvelles between January 2003 and April 2011. To create a map of Forces Nouvelles' territory, I relied on administrative maps provided by the Institut National de la Statistique (INS) in Abidjan. In a small number of cases, I added corrections based on interviews with local officials. The administrative division of the country under the FN occupation is displayed in Appendix Figure 1.

To create the sample, I first created a list of departments (one level higher than sub-prefectures), with data on the electoral vote-share for Alassane Ouattara in the first round of presidential elections in 2010. More recent electoral data in Côte d'Ivoire is problematic as a measure of underlying political partisanship, because Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) leaders have called for electoral boycotts since the arrest of Laurent Gbagbo in 2011. I used data from the 2010 elections because all three major political parties — the RDR, the FPI, and the PDCI — competed on the ballot. Information about voting outcomes was important because I expected political partisanship to influence community support for FN insurgents. I then ordered the departments within each district by vote-share for Ouattara, and selected one department in the bottom third of electoral support, one department in the top third of electoral support, and one department in the middle. Within each bin the department was selected randomly, with the exception that departments in the district that included former FN zone capitals (i.e. the cities where the FN comzones were based, usually the seat of the district capital), were always selected. The rationale of this approach was to achieve a sample of localities that would be reasonably representative in terms of political partisanship, but that also included the rebel zone capitals — locations I needed to visit in order to obtain necessary permissions and collect contacts for other areas.

Once these thirty-three departments were chosen, I selected two to four sub-prefectures to visit within each department for survey enumeration. These locations were selected on the basis of convenience sampling, taking into account considerations such as weather conditions, road quality, security risks, and respondent availability, while also making efforts to include a mix of accessible and more isolated sub-prefectures. After obtaining prior permission from the Ivorian Ministry of Interior in Abidjan, I first visited the seat of the prefecture in the regional capital accompanied by an Ivorian research assistant, in order to explain the purpose of the research project. The Préfet (or another official) then contacted the sub-prefectures we planned to visit, to notify them of our presence in the area.

In two cases, selected sub-prefectures had to be replaced with alternatives due to unforeseen challenges — in one instance a sub-prefecture was dropped due to recent reports of violent banditry along the main access route, and in another instance the local sous-Préfet was unwilling to grant us permission to carry out the survey. It is worth emphasizing that, especially given the sensitive nature of some survey questions, it was imperative to obtain these official forms of approval — often at multiple levels of administration — before conducting

the interviews. Moreover, given the generally low quality of road infrastructure in northern Côte d'Ivoire and the geographic isolation of some sub-prefectures, a sampling strategy based on pure random selection would not have been logistically practical. In addition to the ninety sub-prefectures in the sample, I also carried out surveys in three urban quarters in the city of Bouaké and two quarters in the city of Korhogo. Each quartier in the city has a population roughly equivalent to an average sub-prefecture, and is represented by a *chef de quartier*. Urban quarters were generally governed by an FN sector commander.

The surveyed localities varied significantly in terms of the presence of basic government and commercial services, such as a police or gendarmerie post (55%), a mayoral office building (60%), a hospital or health clinic (95%), a secondary school (70%), and a bank (25%). 47 of 95 localities (49.5%) enjoyed paved road access.



### 3 Survey Questions for Key Variables (English)

The full questionnaire is available at: <https://www.philipandrewmartin.com/ongoing-research/>

Appendix Table 3: Indicators of Collaborative Rule

Variable	Question
FN Organized Meetings	<p>After the arrival of the Forces Nouvelles in this sub-prefecture, did the rebels organize public meetings to explain their intentions to the population?</p> <p>During these meetings, did community members express their needs or make complaints to the rebels?</p> <p>About how often did these meetings happen? (Every day, once a week, once a month, once or twice a year, never)</p>
FN Goods Provision	<p>I am going to make a list of basic services. Please tell me which actors were <i>directly</i> involved in providing each service during the rebel occupation here:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Maintaining order / punishing criminals</li><li>• Protecting the community from external attack</li><li>• Resolving problems of land / property disputes</li><li>• Assuring the functioning of education / re-opening schools</li><li>• Assuring the functioning of health care / re-opening the hospital or health clinic</li><li>• Maintaining infrastructure, for example road repairs</li><li>• Supporting local businesses or traders by providing loans</li></ul>

Appendix Table 4: Indicators of Predatory Rule

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Question</b>
Civilian Victimization	Were there civilians in this sub-prefecture who were victims of physical violence during the rebel occupation?  Who were the perpetrators of this violence?
Pillage	Was there pillage in this sub-prefecture during the rebel occupation, for example the looting of offices or kiosks?  Who was responsible for this pillage?
Rebel-Civilian Tensions	During the rebel occupation, were there ever tensions or difficulties between the population and the Forces Nouvelles in this sub-prefecture? (never, occasionally, frequently)  What were the principal causes of these tensions? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Taxation</li> <li>• Disputes over land / property</li> <li>• Bad comportment by rebel soldiers</li> <li>• Conflicts of authority between community leaders and rebels</li> <li>• Questions of ethnicity</li> <li>• Political attitudes</li> <li>• Other</li> </ul>

Appendix Table 5: Indicators of Postwar Commander-Community Linkages

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Question</b>
Service Provision (post-2011)	Were former members of the Forces Nouvelles involved in the provision any of the following services [in the first two years after the end of the electoral crisis? / today?]
Commander Visits (post-2011)	How often does the former FN commander still visit this sub-prefecture [in the first two years after the end of the electoral crisis? / today?]  On what occasions do these visits occur?
Material Support (post-2011)	On occasion of these visits, does the commander offer any of the following to members of the community? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gifts / offerings to the community (e.g. sugar for Ramadan, scholastic fees for children)</li> <li>• Gifts / offerings to individuals (e.g. money to organize weddings or funerals, gifts to traditional leaders)</li> <li>• Pocket money or jobs to former FN elements</li> <li>• He does not bring support</li> </ul> Does the commander finance any development projects (e.g. roads, schools, mosques), or own commercial interests in this sub-prefecture?
Political position (post-2011)	Was the commander or another former member of the FN elected/appointed to any of the following positions since 2011? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deputy candidate for National Assembly</li> <li>• Mayor of adjoint-mayor</li> <li>• Regional councillor</li> <li>• Other civil servant position at prefecture or mairie</li> <li>• Member of local political party branch</li> <li>• Member of local NGO or civil society group</li> </ul>

## 4 Robustness Checks

### 4.1 Citizen Uptake of Police Services

To investigate the link between commander-community linkages and citizen access to re-deployed police, I examine data from the 2014 ENV household quality of life survey. This survey of over twelve thousand households collected information on household proximity and access to various forms of infrastructure, including the nearest police/gendarmes commissariat. When asked how long it takes to travel to the commissariat, a relatively large proportion of household head respondents (nearly one half) answered that they either “never go there,” or that the police/gendarmes “do not exist,” even examining only those sub-prefectures where a commissariat did in fact exist in 2014.<sup>1</sup> Conditional on the existence of a police commissariat, we can infer that either of these responses indicate that respondents likely *do not* make use of formal police services. While the ENV survey enumeration areas overlap with sixty-seven sub-prefectures covered by my community informant survey, I restrict the analysis to those sub-prefectures where a police/gendarmes commissariat existed in 2014. This reduces the sample to 2,724 households across forty-eight localities.<sup>2</sup>

In Appendix Table 6, I estimate the relationship between *Postwar Commander Influence* (measured at the sub-prefecture level) and an individual-level dummy variable indicating whether respondents could explain how they travelled to the nearest police commissariat. I include a large number of control variables at the individual and sub-prefecture level; notably, I account for respondents’ baseline knowledgeability and responsiveness by controlling for whether the respondent explained how they travelled to the local market (*Aware Market*). Even after accounting for these potential confounders, we see there is a substantial negative link between the strength of commander-community linkages (as measured on my survey) and household-head use of police services (as measured on the ENV survey): respondents in areas with strong commander-community linkages were approximately 3 percentage points less likely [-0.01, -0.05] to express awareness of how to access the police commissariat than citizens in areas with weak ex-rebel commander linkages.<sup>3</sup> This suggests that in areas where ex-rebel commanders have continued to play an important social role within communities, citizens are less likely to turn to the state police to help regulate issues of criminality. In column two, we see that *Rebel Goods Provision* also has a negative association with citizen awareness of the police commissariat, as expected. Wartime predation by FN rebels, meanwhile, has a positive association with awareness of the police commissariat (column three).

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<sup>1</sup>To verify the presence or absence of commissariats, I use two separate sources: the structured interviews I conducted with local historical experts (which asked for the year that the prefectural corps and police commissariat were re-deployed), and the R5 and R6 Afrobarometer surveys.

<sup>2</sup>The 2008 ENV survey also collected information on infrastructure access. However, since the national territory was not re-unified at the time and many police commissariats remained deserted or occupied by the FN in 2008, I cannot use a difference-in-difference approach.

<sup>3</sup>Estimates obtained using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations.


To verify that the “substitution” effect of community-commander linkages is confined to state institutions relating to law and order, I estimate the likelihood of citizen awareness of how to access thirteen different forms of service infrastructure included on the ENV survey using the same set of predictor variables. Appendix Figure 2 shows the change in predicted probabilities associated with moving *Postwar Commander Influence* from its minimum to maximum value. Consistent with expectations, there are only significant negative effects for infrastructure that generally relates to the provision of law and security: the police commissariat, the mayoral office, and the Prefecture. For all other services, effects are either positive or indistinguishable from zero. This accords with the idea that ex-rebel commanders with strong ties to postwar communities have remained involved in local affairs primarily in the security sphere.

Appendix Table 6: Determinants of Aware How to Access Police Commissariat (Logit)

	DV: aware how to access police commissariat		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Postwar Commander Influence Index (SP)	-0.181*** (0.069)		
Rebel Goods Provision (SP)		-0.109** (0.053)	
Predation Index (SP)			0.215*** (0.046)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.0005 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)
Senoufo/Malinke	0.560*** (0.107)	0.614*** (0.106)	0.616*** (0.106)
Muslim	-0.054 (0.104)	-0.028 (0.104)	-0.091 (0.106)
Rural	-1.036*** (0.119)	-1.064*** (0.120)	-1.139*** (0.127)
Female	-0.157 (0.114)	-0.148 (0.114)	-0.162 (0.114)
Aware Market	2.048*** (0.134)	2.026*** (0.134)	2.027*** (0.133)
Infrastructure Index (SP)	0.096 (0.073)	0.066 (0.071)	0.027 (0.072)
Combat (SP)	-0.010 (0.119)	0.132 (0.132)	0.095 (0.118)
RDR voteshare (SP)	0.027*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.004)
Ethnicity Northern (SP)	0.016 (0.123)	-0.003 (0.128)	0.515*** (0.157)
Constant	-2.554*** (0.585)	-2.497*** (0.582)	-2.751*** (0.600)
Observations	2724	2724	2724
N Sub-prefectures	48	48	48

Notes: SP = sub-prefecture level variable. Robust standard errors clustered at the sub-prefecture level.  
Statistical significance: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Effects of Postwar Commander Linkages on Service Awareness (N=2,724)**



Appendix Figure 2: Estimated change in predicted probability of citizen awareness of how to access services associated with moving *Postwar Commander Influence* from the minimum to the maximum value, with other variables held at medians. Lines show 95 percent confidence intervals. Includes only sub-prefectures where police commissariat existed in 2014.

## 4.2 Additional Controls and Alternative Governance Measures

Appendix Table 7: Robustness checks - additional controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Postwar Commander Influence Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rebel Goods Provision	0.264** (0.103)	0.248* (0.144)	0.260* (0.140)	0.284*** (0.097)	0.233** (0.096)	0.372*** (0.130)
Population (ln)	0.302 (0.186)	0.438 (0.298)	0.432 (0.295)	0.289* (0.157)	0.270* (0.143)	0.272 (0.187)
Infrastructure Index	0.163** (0.082)	0.173 (0.148)	0.265* (0.146)	0.135* (0.080)	0.154** (0.074)	0.114 (0.097)
Paved Road	-0.033 (0.261)	-0.502 (0.426)	-0.492 (0.431)	-0.007 (0.252)	-0.002 (0.238)	-0.187 (0.282)
Ethnicity Northern		-0.051 (0.402)	-0.017 (0.405)	-0.042 (0.266)	-0.076 (0.218)	0.079 (0.287)
Combat	-0.186 (0.256)	0.113 (0.414)	-0.182 (0.440)	-0.183 (0.257)	-0.149 (0.234)	-0.332 (0.283)
Recruitment	0.267 (0.386)	0.382 (0.658)	0.187 (0.647)	0.228 (0.333)	0.259 (0.314)	0.143 (0.393)
Northern Ethnicity (%)	-0.367 (0.293)					
Household Poverty (%)		-0.692 (0.679)				
Household Victimization (%)			0.184 (0.128)			
Block Voting Index				0.001 (0.009)		
Mining Site					0.736** (0.311)	
Distance to Ceasefire Zone						-0.060 (0.194)
Constant	-3.375** (1.685)	-4.532* (2.512)	-5.637** (2.688)	-3.266** (1.564)	-3.105** (1.241)	-2.929* (1.630)
Observations	75	46	45	85	87	64
R <sup>2</sup>	0.461	0.415	0.430	0.422	0.464	0.452
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.405	0.288	0.303	0.361	0.409	0.372

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Appendix Table 8: Robustness checks - additional controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Postwar Commander Influence Index					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Organized Meetings	0.686*** (0.226)	0.888*** (0.292)	0.994*** (0.287)	0.665*** (0.217)	0.563*** (0.207)	0.619** (0.238)
Population (ln)	0.521*** (0.183)	0.707*** (0.252)	0.763*** (0.249)	0.485*** (0.161)	0.423*** (0.146)	0.376* (0.196)
Infrastructure Index	0.136 (0.082)	0.064 (0.142)	0.173 (0.137)	0.104 (0.082)	0.132* (0.075)	0.158* (0.094)
Paved Road	-0.059 (0.256)	-0.529 (0.393)	-0.610 (0.388)	0.016 (0.250)	-0.004 (0.236)	-0.309 (0.288)
Ethnicity Northern		-0.149 (0.372)	-0.144 (0.361)	-0.221 (0.259)	-0.158 (0.211)	-0.055 (0.284)
Combat	-0.155 (0.252)	0.035 (0.386)	-0.306 (0.398)	-0.167 (0.256)	-0.117 (0.232)	-0.186 (0.284)
Recruitment	0.121 (0.389)	0.284 (0.612)	-0.028 (0.588)	0.232 (0.330)	0.230 (0.313)	0.408 (0.366)
Northern Ethnicity (%)	-0.449 (0.278)					
Household Poverty (%)		-0.739 (0.613)				
Household Victimization (%)			0.194* (0.105)			
Block Voting Index				0.006 (0.009)		
Mining Site					0.798*** (0.302)	
Distance to Ceasefire Zone						-0.169 (0.194)
Constant	-5.077*** (1.656)	-6.347*** (2.216)	-8.220*** (2.319)	-5.002*** (1.594)	-4.277*** (1.269)	-3.781** (1.699)
Observations	75	46	45	85	87	64
R <sup>2</sup>	0.481	0.494	0.533	0.428	0.473	0.438
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.426	0.385	0.430	0.367	0.419	0.356

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Appendix Table 9: Robustness checks - Alternative Measures of Collaborative Rule

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Postwar Commander Influence Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Leaders mediated disputes with FN	0.452* (0.246)			
Leaders provided services with FN		0.456* (0.234)		
Leaders supported FN politically			0.909*** (0.314)	
Collaborative governance spectrum				0.347*** (0.117)
Rebel Goods Provision	0.263*** (0.095)	0.264*** (0.094)	0.244** (0.092)	
Population (ln)	0.335** (0.147)	0.257* (0.145)	0.241* (0.141)	0.340** (0.146)
Infrastructure Index	0.127* (0.075)	0.120 (0.075)	0.110 (0.073)	0.139* (0.076)
Paved Road	-0.008 (0.241)	0.016 (0.241)	0.045 (0.235)	0.053 (0.245)
Ethnicity Northern	-0.043 (0.220)	-0.002 (0.220)	-0.058 (0.214)	-0.146 (0.220)
Combat	-0.206 (0.237)	-0.273 (0.239)	-0.233 (0.230)	-0.083 (0.243)
Recruitment	0.048 (0.329)	0.145 (0.318)	0.233 (0.309)	0.184 (0.327)
Constant	-3.774*** (1.298)	-2.827** (1.267)	-2.616** (1.236)	-3.318** (1.278)
Observations	87	87	87	87
R <sup>2</sup>	0.449	0.452	0.481	0.421
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.393	0.396	0.428	0.369

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Note: Collaborative governance spectrum is an index that adds points for *Rebel Goods Provision* and *Organized meetings*, and subtracts points for *Predation Index*.

Appendix Table 10: Robustness checks - Rebels Provide Security Only

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
Postwar Commander Influence Index	
Security Only	0.401 (0.416)
Population (ln)	0.376** (0.156)
Infrastructure Index	0.167** (0.080)
Paved Road	-0.0001 (0.260)
Ethnicity Northern	-0.137 (0.231)
Combat	-0.170 (0.253)
Recruitment	0.344 (0.352)
Constant	-4.056*** (1.423)
Observations	87
R <sup>2</sup>	0.363
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.307

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Note: Security Only takes 1 if rebels provided either policing or protection from external attack, and 0 otherwise.

Appendix Table 11: Robustness checks - Department Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Postwar Commander Influence Index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rebel Goods Provision	0.284** (0.137)		
Organized Meetings		0.843*** (0.251)	
Collaborative governance spectrum			0.447*** (0.158)
Population (ln)	0.162 (0.206)	0.391** (0.191)	0.166 (0.196)
Infrastructure Index	0.142 (0.099)	0.114 (0.092)	0.159* (0.092)
Paved Road	0.237 (0.367)	0.286 (0.345)	0.428 (0.361)
Ethnicity Northern	-0.532 (0.625)	-0.433 (0.581)	-0.872 (0.625)
Combat	-0.377 (0.330)	-0.310 (0.309)	-0.256 (0.319)
Recruitment	0.252 (0.393)	0.213 (0.360)	0.201 (0.376)
Constant	-2.288 (1.826)	-3.943** (1.699)	-1.887 (1.775)
Observations	87	87	87
R <sup>2</sup>	0.638	0.681	0.662
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.351	0.428	0.395

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Note: Department fixed effects omitted from table